In his book Pandora’s Hope (a reading I have been doing for a different class), Latour discusses the concept of validity of scientific knowledge through circulating reference. While the original context was that of physical sciences, I am going to (attempt to) present this concept through a more ethnographic lens, as applicable to the participation observation methodology. I’m not sure what I’m hoping to achieve with this, but I’m finding these philosophies of validity much more interesting than a step-by-step guide to execute method ‘x’.
1. Knowledge is not an extraction of an essence from the world, but the enhancement (either through magnification or reduction) of the phenomenon.
2. For knowledge to be an abstraction, it must produce a sign; this sign is separate from matter, thus creating a gap.
Abstraction is by definition an alternative view of the world, simplified to the course of understanding. There is a jump to be made, a gap between the world (matter, or in our case, an experience/social structure, etc) and the form (the sign or the observation/the theory). Like a gestalt shift, you can only see one at a time, not hold the views simultaneously; in other words, “In loosing the forest, we win knowledge of it” (Latour, 38).
3. Signs are referent to matter
Like electricity running through a circuit, the element of truth runs through the signs and (this is important) is always connected to reality via this vein. Reference is not what you point to, somehow outside the discourse, but what you bring back inside to the discourse.
****
****
One of the dangers Luker described of being a member of an participate-observation is to be too close to the phenomenon that you fail to see the the assumptions, the theory. Shaffir echos this idea when he said it was important to "respect the gap" between you and the observational group. Quite nicely, Latour illustrates this gap in the diagrams.
If this gap is necessary to produce 'knowledge' (i.e. a form, a theory), what is lost in the jump? Latour makes it clear it is not reality (it must be connected to it, alway referential), but it is the whole of reality, in its massive unformed complexity. To destroy the gap, to close it, is to eliminate knowledge in the sense that no order is rising above it. Participant observation, thus, becomes dependent on the gap.
If this gap is necessary to produce 'knowledge' (i.e. a form, a theory), what is lost in the jump? Latour makes it clear it is not reality (it must be connected to it, alway referential), but it is the whole of reality, in its massive unformed complexity. To destroy the gap, to close it, is to eliminate knowledge in the sense that no order is rising above it. Participant observation, thus, becomes dependent on the gap.
No comments:
Post a Comment